Rewiring Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The Canada–Japan–France Partnership

For much of the past decade, critical mineral diplomacy was framed through a binary lens: either align with China—the dominant player in extraction, refining, and processing—or rally behind US-led friendshoring efforts. That binary is now breaking down. A new triangular alignment between Canada, Japan, and France is beginning to take shape within the G7, driven by a shared recognition that overdependence on both Beijing’s mineral dominance and Washington’s increasingly transactional industrial policy creates strategic vulnerabilities. What is emerging is not an anti-American coalition, nor an anti-China bloc in the conventional sense; rather, it is a middle-power effort to build supply chain resilience through strategic autonomy.

The roots of this alignment lie in the earlier logic of Canada–Japan critical mineral cooperation. Japan needed reliable upstream access to minerals such as lithium, graphite, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths to sustain its automotive, battery, and semiconductor sectors. Canada, meanwhile, possessed abundant reserves but required capital, technology, and long-term buyers to make projects commercially viable. The partnership made strategic sense: Japan could reduce its dependence on Chinese mineral inputs, while Canada could move beyond being merely a raw material exporter and become embedded in higher-value clean technology supply chains.

This logic became visible in concrete projects. Canada’s Nouveau Monde Graphite (NMG) Matawinie Mine in Quebec emerged as one of the most prominent examples of bilateral cooperation. The project secured support from Japanese firms, including Panasonic Energy and Mitsui & Co., alongside Canadian state-backed financing mechanisms. The goal was clear: to create one of North America’s largest integrated graphite facilities to support battery manufacturing while reducing dependence on Chinese graphite refining. Ottawa explicitly positioned the project as part of broader G7 supply chain diversification efforts.

But by 2025–26, however, the strategic conversation had shifted. The challenge was no longer simply dependence on China; it was also the growing uncertainty surrounding US industrial policy. The return of more protectionist trade measures in Washington, combined with efforts to create a preferential, US-led minerals bloc, generated unease among allies. In February 2026, the United States proposed a preferential trade arrangement for critical minerals among select partners. Yet rather than uniformly falling in line, Canada, Japan, and France began exploring parallel mechanisms that would provide greater policy flexibility and strategic room for manoeuvre.

This is where France entered the equation in a significant way. Unlike Canada, France does not possess substantial upstream reserves. However, due to its processing capabilities, industrial financing capacity, and growing drive to build European infrastructure for rare-earth refining, it plays a crucial midstream role. In March 2026, Japan and France signed a new rare-earth cooperation roadmap during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tokyo. The agreement focused specifically on heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium—materials essential for EV motors, semiconductors, and defence technologies. Crucially, Japan committed to sourcing nearly 20 percent of future demand from France-backed refining projects such as Caremag.

Given its upstream scale, Canada’s contribution to this trilateral alignment is arguably the most significant. Ottawa has made a concerted effort to position itself as the cornerstone of a broader associated minerals ecosystem. Under the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan launched during Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency in Kananaskis, Ottawa pushed for “standards-based markets,” financing mechanisms, and diversified offtake agreements. By October 2025, Canada had announced 26 investments and partnerships with nine countries, including Japan and France, unlocking billions of dollars in mining and refining investments.

More significantly, Canada began advocating what officials described as a “buyers’ club” model. This marked an important shift in critical mineral diplomacy. Rather than allowing China to dominate pricing or Washington to shape market architecture, Canada proposed coordinated purchasing among trusted partners to guarantee demand for non-Chinese suppliers. Such a mechanism would help address a central challenge in critical minerals markets: Chinese suppliers often undercut prices, rendering alternative mining projects commercially unviable.

Japan strongly backed this approach because it aligns with Tokyo’s long-standing economic security doctrine. Since China’s 2010 rare-earth restrictions on Japan following the Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis, Tokyo has pursued aggressive supply diversification. Its dependence on Chinese rare earths has reportedly fallen from nearly 90 percent to around 60 percent through investments in Australia and Southeast Asia, recycling technologies, and now partnerships with Canada and France. The trilateral framework therefore represents an extension of Japan’s broader de-risking strategy rather than a sudden policy shift.

France’s role is equally strategic. As the 2026 G7 chair, Paris has increasingly framed critical minerals as a question of European strategic sovereignty. French policymakers contend that relying solely on American industrial frameworks risks substituting one dependency for another. This explains why France opposes unilateral measures and places strong emphasis on multilateral collaboration. French officials have repeatedly called for trust-based coordination rather than fragmented national industrial policies.

What makes this trilateral alignment particularly significant is that it reflects the rise of minilateralism within the G7 itself. Traditionally, the G7 functioned through broad consensus led by Washington. Today, smaller coalitions are forming within the grouping to pursue narrower strategic goals. Canada, Japan, and France are effectively creating a sub-group focused on mineral resilience, industrial coordination, and supply chain diversification.

This alignment has broader Indo-Pacific implications. Japan views critical minerals as central to maintaining technological competitiveness vis-à-vis China. Canada increasingly sees mineral diplomacy as a core pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy. France, with territories and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, considers mineral security an integral part of its wider regional role. Their convergence reflects how resource geopolitics is becoming embedded within broader Indo-Pacific strategic competition.

Yet challenges remain. Mining projects face environmental opposition, Indigenous rights concerns, long permitting timelines, and high costs. Processing capacity remains heavily concentrated in China. Even among allies, industrial interests often diverge. The United States remains too large a player to ignore.

Still, the broader trend is unmistakable. The Canada–Japan relationship laid the foundation. France expanded the architecture. Together, the three countries are attempting something far more ambitious: building a critical minerals ecosystem that is neither dependent on Chinese coercion nor vulnerable to American unpredictability. In an era when supply chains are increasingly instruments of geopolitical power, this may prove to be one of the most consequential strategic experiments underway within the G7 today.